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ABSTRACT
Defaults can have a dramatic influence on consumer decisions. We identify an overlooked but practical
alternative to defaults: requiring individuals to make an explicit choice for themselves. We study such
"active decisions" in the context of 401(k) saving. We find that compelling new hires to make active
decisions about 401(k) enrollment raises the initial fraction that enroll by 28 percentage points relative
to a standard opt-in enrollment procedure, producing a savings distribution three months after hire
that would take three years to achieve under standard enrollment. We also present a model of 401(k)
enrollment and characterize the optimal enrollment regime. Active decisions are optimal when consumers
have a strong propensity to procrastinate and savings preferences that are highly heterogeneous. Naive
beliefs about future time-inconsistency strengthen the normative appeal of the active-decision enrollment
regime. However, financial illiteracy favors default enrollment over active decision enrollment.
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metrick@yale.eduEx ante, it might seem that a default should not matter if agents believe it is arbitrarily
chosen and if opting out of the default is easy. In practice, defaults–even bad defaults–tend
to be sticky; individuals often fail to opt out.1 This perverse property of defaults has been
documented in a wide range of settings: participation in employer-sponsored savings plans
(Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick, 2004), organ donation rates
(Johnson and Goldstein, 2003; Abadie and Gay, 2004), car insurance plan choices (Johnson
et al., 1993), car option purchases (Park, Yun and MacInnis, 2000), and consent to receive
e-mail marketing (Johnson, Bellman, and Lohse, 2002).
In light of this inertia, defaults may be socially optimal when agents have a shared
optimum and the default leads them to it. But even a well-chosen default may be undesirable
if agents have heterogeneous needs. For example, in a ﬁrm whose workforce includes young,
cash-strapped single parents and older employees who need to quickly build a retirement
nest egg, one 401(k) savings rate isn’t right for everyone.
Given that defaults can exert a tremendous impact on observed outcomes, an important
question is, “which default is optimal?” We consider the answer to this question in a speciﬁc
context: participation in employer-sponsored 401(k) savings plans. Economists have studied
two diferent savings plan enrollment regimes. Under “standard enrollment,” employees are
by default not enrolled and can choose to opt into the plan. Under “automatic enrollment,”
employees are by default enrolled at a pre-determined contribution rate and can choose to
o p to u to ft h ep l a no ro u to ft h ed e f a u l tc o n t r i b u tion rate. There is also a third, overlooked
alternative: require individuals to make an explicit choice for themselves. In this “active-
decision” regime, there is no default to fall back on.
Active decisions are an intriguing, though imperfect, alternative to defaults. On the pos-
itive side, an active-decision mechanism avoids the biases introduced by defaults because it
does not corral agents into a single default choice. The active-decision mechanism encourages
agents to think about an important decision and thereby avoid procrastinating. On the neg-
ative side, an active decision compels agents to struggle with a potentially time-consuming
1For example, about three-quarters of 401(k) participants in ﬁrms with automatic enrollment retain both
the default contribution rate and the default asset allocation (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et al. 2002,
2004). These “choices” are puzzling because most companies with automatic enrollment have had very
conservative defaults; a typical ﬁrm might have a default contribution rate of 3% of income, even though
contributions up to 6% of income garner matching contributions from the employer.
3decision–which they may not feel qualiﬁed to make. Some individuals would welcome a
benign third party who is willing to make that decision for them. And some social engineers
might prefer a default that aggressively encourages some social goal, like organ donation or
retirement saving.2
The current paper lays the groundwork for a debate about active decisions by describing
how an active-decision 401(k) enrollment regime worked at one large ﬁrm. In addition, we
present a model that provides a formal framework for evaluating the relative eﬃcacy of
diﬀerent enrollment mechanisms, including defaults and active decisions.
Our empirical analysis exploits a natural experiment in the 401(k) enrollment regime
of a large ﬁrm that switched from using active decisions to a standard-enrollment regime.
This change in 401(k) enrollment procedures occurred unintentionally as a by-product of the
transition from a paper-and-pencil administrative system to a phone-based administrative
system. The ﬁrm did not anticipate that the transition to a phone-based system with a
default of non-enrollment would transform the psychology of 401(k) participation. Rather,
the change in administrative systems was motivated solely by the convenience and eﬃciency
of phone-based enrollment. The loss of active-decision eﬀects was a collateral consequence
of that transition.
We ﬁnd that active decisions raise the initial fraction of employees enrolled by 28 percent-
age points relative to what is obtained with a standard default of non-enrollment. Active
decisions raise average savings rates and accumulated balances by accelerating decision-
making. We show that conditional on demographics, employees under an active-decision
regime will on average immediately choose a savings rate similar to what would otherwise
take up to 30 months to attain under standard enrollment. Because the typical worker
will change jobs several times before retirement, accelerating the 401(k) savings decision by
more than two years at the beginning of each job transition can have a large impact on
accumulated wealth at retirement.
We also present a model of the enrollment process. In this model, defaults matter for
two key reasons. First, the opportunity cost of time is stochastic, creating an option value to
waiting for a low-cost time to take action. Second, employees with present-biased preferences
2See Hurst (2006) and Warshawsky and Ameriks (2000) for evidence that many U.S. households are
u n d e r s a v i n g . H o w e v e r ,t h i si sa no p e nq u e s t i o nw i t hr e s e a r c ho nb o t hs i d e so ft h ed e b a t e . S e eA g u i a r
and Hurst (2005) and Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999) for evidence that the lifecycle model with liquidity
constraints matches U.S. data.
4(Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999b) may procrastinate
in their decision to opt out of the default. We derive conditions for the optimal enrollment
regime. Active decisions are socially optimal when consumers have highly heterogeneous
savings preferences and a strong propensity to procrastinate.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the details of the two
401(k) enrollment regimes at the company we study. Section 2 describes our data. Section
3 compares the 401(k) savings decisions of employees hired under the active-decision regime
to those hired under the standard-enrollment regime. Section 4 presents a model of procras-
tination for time-inconsistent agents with rational expectations, uses this model to derive
the socially optimal enrollment mechanism for such agents, and brieﬂy considers the case of
agents with naive expectations about their future time-inconsistency. We also discuss the
optimal amount of time agents should be given before a decision deadline binds. Section 5
discusses the key implications of the model. Section 6 concludes and brieﬂy discusses the
implementation of active-decision mechanisms.
1T h e N a t u r a l E x p e r i m e n t
We use employee-level data from a publicly traded Fortune 500 company in the ﬁnancial
services industry. In December 1999, this ﬁrm had oﬃces in all 50 states, as well as the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. This paper considers the 401(k) savings decisions of
employees at the ﬁrm from January 1997 through December 2001.
Until November 1997, all newly hired full-time employees at the ﬁrm were required to
submit a form within 30 days of their hire date stating their 401(k) participation preferences,
regardless of whether they wished to enroll or not. Although there was no tangible penalty
for non-compliance, human-resource oﬃc e r sa tt h i sﬁrm report that only 5% of employees
did not return the form.3 We believe that this high compliance rate arose because the form
was part of a packet that included other forms that are legally required to be completed (e.g.,
employment-eligibility veriﬁcation forms, tax-withholding forms). Moreover, employees who
did not return the form were reminded to do so by the human-resources department.
Employees who declined to participate in the 401(k) plan during this initial enrollment
period could not subsequently enroll in the plan until the beginning (January 1) of succeeding
3A failure to return the form was ultimately treated as a decision not to enroll in the 401(k).
5calendar years. Later in the paper, we will show that this delay did not drive the active-
decision eﬀects that we document.
At the beginning of November 1997, the company switched from a paper-based 401(k)
enrollment system to a telephone-based system. Employees hired after this change no longer
received a 401(k) enrollment form when hired. Instead, they were given a toll-free phone
number to call if and when they wished to enroll in the 401(k) plan. We call this new system
the “standard-enrollment” regime because its default of non-participation is what has been
adopted by most companies. The telephone-based system also allowed employees to enroll
on a daily basis, rather than only at the beginning of each calendar year as had previously
been the case. This change applied not only to employees hired after November 1997, but
to all employees working at the company.
A number of other 401(k) plan features also changed at the same time (November, 1997).
We believe that these additional changes made 401(k) participation more attractive, so
our estimates of the active-decision eﬀect are a lower bound on the true eﬀect. These other
changes include a switch from monthly to daily account valuation, the introduction of 401(k)
loans, the addition of two new funds as well as employer stock to the 401(k) investment
portfolio,4 and a switch from annual to quarterly 401(k) statements. Table 1 summarizes
the 401(k) plan rules before and after the November 1997 plan changes.
2T h e D a t a
We have two types of employee data. The ﬁrst dataset is a series of cross-sections at year-
ends 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. Each cross-section contains demographic information for
everybody employed by the company at the time, including birth date, hire date, gender,
marital status, state of residence, and salary. For 401(k) plan participants, each cross-section
also contains the date of enrollment and year-end information on balances, asset allocation,
and the terms of any outstanding 401(k) loans. The second dataset is a longitudinal history
of every individual transaction in the plan from September 1997 through April 2002: savings-
rate elections, asset-allocation elections for contributions, trades among funds, loan-based
withdrawals and repayments, ﬁnancial-hardship withdrawals, retirement withdrawals, and
4Prior to November 1997, employer stock was available as an investment option only for match balances
and contributions made with after-tax money.
6rollovers.
To analyze the impact of active decisions on savings outcomes, we compare the behavior
of two employee groups: employees hired between January 1, 1997 and July 31, 1997 under
the active-decision regime,5 and employees hired between January 1, 1998 and July 31, 1998
under the standard-enrollment regime. We refer to the ﬁrst group as the “active-decision
cohort” and the second group as the “standard-enrollment cohort.”
The active-decision cohort is ﬁrst observed in our cross-sectional data in December 1998,
18 to 24 months after hire, and in the longitudinal data starting in September 1997, 3 to 9
months after hire. The longitudinal data only contain 401(k) participants. The standard-
enrollment cohort is also observed in our cross-sectional data starting in December 1998, but
this is only 6 to 12 months after their hire date. In the longitudinal data, 401(k) participants
f r o mt h i sc o h o r ta r eo b s e r v e da ss o o na st h e ye n r o l l .
Since 401(k) participants are less likely to subsequently leave their employer,6 our data
structure introduces selection eﬀects that are stronger for the active-decision cohort than
the standard-enrollment cohort. To equalize the sample selectivity of the active-decision
and standard-enrollment cohorts, we restrict both cohorts to employees who were still at the
company in December of the year after their hire year. We have no reason to believe that the
turnover rates of employees from these two cohorts were diﬀerent over these time horizons.
The economic environment faced by these two groups of employees was similar until the start
of the 2001 recession. In addition, company oﬃcials reported no material changes in hiring
or employment practices during this period.
Table 2 presents demographic statistics on the active-decision and standard-enrollment
cohorts at the end of December in the year after they were hired. The cohorts are similar in
age, gender composition, income, and geographical distribution. The dimension along which
they diﬀer most is marital status, and even here the diﬀerences are not large: 56.0% of the
active-decision cohort is married, while this is true for only 49.7% of the standard-enrollment
cohort. The third column of Table 2 shows that the new-hire cohorts are diﬀerent from
5We exclude employees hired prior to January 1, 1997 because the company made two plan changes that
took eﬀect on January 1, 1997. First, the company eliminated a one-year service requirement for 401(k)
eligibility. Second, the company changed the structure of its 401(k) match. Although active decisions were
used until the end of October 1997, we do not include employees hired from August through October to avoid
any confounds produced by the transition to standard enrollment. For example, an enrollment blackout was
implemented for several weeks during the transition.
6See Even and MacPherson (2005).
7employees at the company overall. As expected, the new-hire cohorts are younger, less likely
to be married, and paid less on average. The last column reports statistics from the Current
Population Survey, providing a comparison between the company’s employees and the total
U.S. workforce. The company has a relatively high fraction of female employees, probably
because it is in the service sector. Employees at the company also have relatively high
salaries. This is partially due to the fact that the company does not employ a representative
fraction of very young employees, who are more likely to work part-time and at lower wages.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 401(k) Enrollment
We ﬁrst examine the impact of the active-decision regime on enrollment in the 401(k). Figure
1p l o t st h ef r a c t i o ne n r o l l e di nt h e4 0 1 ( k )a f t e rt h r e em o n t h so ft e n u r ef o re m p l o y e e sw h ow e r e
h i r e di nt h eﬁrst seven months of 1997 (the active-decision cohort) and the ﬁrst seven months
o f1 9 9 8( t h es t a n d a r d - e n r o l l m e n tc o h o r t ) .W eu s et h et h i r dm o n t ho ft e n u r eb e c a u s ei tc o u l d
take up to three months for enrollments to be processed in the active-decision regime.7 The
average three-month enrollment rate is 69% for the active-decision cohort, versus 41% for
the standard-enrollment cohort, and this diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level
for every hire month.
Figure 2 plots the fraction of employees who have enrolled in the 401(k) plan against
tenure. The participation rate of the active-decision cohort is a sizeable 28 percentage
points higher than that of the standard-enrollment cohort at 3 months of tenure. Over
time, the participation rate of the active-decision cohort grows more slowly than that of
the standard-enrollment cohort, so the enrollment gap decreases with tenure. Nonetheless,
the participation rate of the active-decision cohort exceeds that of the standard-enrollment
cohort by 17 percentage points at 24 months of tenure, and by 5 percentage points at 42
months. The participation diﬀerence between the two cohorts are statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% level for every tenure level after the ﬁrst month.
Figures 1 and 2 could be misleading if enrollees under the active-decision regime are
7Enrollments were only processed on the ﬁrst of each month under the active-decision regime. Since
employees had 30 days to turn in their form, an employee who was hired late in a month and turned in her
form just before the deadline could be enrolled in the third month after her hire.
8subsequently more likely to stop contributing to the 401(k) plan. However, attrition rates
from the 401(k) plan are indistinguishable under the active-decision regime and the standard-
enrollment regime. Indeed, 401(k) participation is a nearly absorbing state under either
enrollment regime.8
We ascribe the active-decision eﬀect to the fact that active-decision employees had to
express their 401(k) participation decision during their ﬁrst month of employment, rather
than being able to delay taking action indeﬁnitely. However, there is another distinction be-
tween the active-decision and standard-enrollment regimes as implemented at the company.
Under the standard-enrollment regime, employees could enroll in the 401(k) plan at any
time. Under the active-decision regime, if employees did not enroll in the plan in their ﬁrst
30 days at the company, their next enrollment opportunity did not come until January 1 of
the following calendar year.9 Therefore, in addition to the required aﬃrmative or negative
enrollment decision, the active-decision cohort faced a narrower enrollment window than the
standard-enrollment cohort. In theory, this limited enrollment window could cause higher
initial 401(k) enrollment rates by accelerating the enrollment of employees who would have
otherwise enrolled between the third month of their tenure and the following January.
However, the enrollment diﬀerences between the cohorts are too large to be explained
by a window eﬀect. If only a window eﬀect were operative, enrollment fractions for the two
groups should be equal after twelve months of tenure. In fact, the enrollment fraction of the
active-decision cohort at three months of tenure is not matched by the standard-enrollment
cohort until 30 months of tenure.
3.2 401(k) Contribution Rate
Although active decisions induce earlier 401(k) enrollment, this may come at the cost of
more careful and deliberate thinking about how much to save for retirement. We now turn
our focus to the impact of active decisions on the 401(k) contribution rate.
Figure 3 plots the relationship between tenure and the average 401(k) contribution rate for
the active-decision and standard-enrollment cohorts. The averages include both participants
8These calculations are available from the authors.
9In fact, the active-decision cohort we analyze (January to June 1997 hires) was able to enroll in the
401(k) plan any time after November 1997, when the company switched to the phone-based daily enrollment
system. At hire, however, the active-decision employees were not aware of this impending change and would
have believed January 1, 1998 to be their next enrollment opportunity.
9(who have a non-zero contribution rate) and non-participants (who have a zero contribution
rate). Because our longitudinal data do not start until September 1997, the contribution-rate
proﬁle cannot be computed for the entire active-decision cohort until 9 months of tenure.
The active-decision cohort contributes 4.8% of income on average at month 9, and this
slowly increases to 5.5% of income by the fourth year of employment. In contrast, the
standard-enrollment cohort contributes only 3.6% of income on average at month 9, and
it takes more than 33 months for it to match the active-decision cohort’s nine-month sav-
i n g sr a t e . A te a c ht e n u r el e v e li nt h eg r a p h ,t h ed i ﬀerence between the groups’ average
contribution rates is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Figure 4 plots the average contribution rate of employees who have a non-zero contribu-
tion rate (i.e., 401(k) participants). In contrast to Figure 3, active-decision participants have
a lower average contribution rate than standard-enrollment participants until the fourth year
of tenure.10 To gain insight into this pattern, we plot the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th per-
centile contribution rates for the standard-enrollment and active-decision cohorts in Figure
5. Non-participants are assigned a zero contribution rate and are included in these distrib-
utions. We see that at each of these points in the distribution, the active-decision cohort’s
contribution rate matches or exceeds the standard-enrollment cohort’s contribution rate at
virtually every tenure level. There is nearly no gap between the two cohorts’ contribution
rates at the 90th percentile, where enrollment in the 401(k) occurs immediately for both
groups. As we move down the savings distribution, the diﬀerence between the two cohorts
tends to increase, and most of this diﬀerence is due to active-decision cohort employees sign-
ing up for the 401(k) plan earlier in their tenure. Overall, it seems that employees save at
roughly the same rate under both regimes once they have enrolled. Therefore, the lower
average contribution rate among active-decision participants is not due to active decisions
lowering the savings rates of those who would have otherwise contributed more under stan-
dard enrollment. Rather, active decisions bring employees with weaker savings motives into
the participant pool earlier in their tenure — a selection eﬀect.
Table 3 presents the results of a tobit regression of the two regimes’ contribution rates on
demographic variables. The contribution rate is censored below at 0% and above at 17% of
pay. Both active-decision and standard-enrollment employees are included in the regression,
10These diﬀerences are statistically diﬀerent at the 1% level through the 29th month of tenure, and at the
5% level through the 30th month of tenure.
10regardless of participation status. If the employee was hired under the standard-enrollment
regime, the dependent variable is equal to the contribution rate at 30 months after hire. If
the employee was hired under the active-decision regime, the dependent variable is equal
to an estimate11 of the contribution rate at 3 months after hire. The explanatory variables
are a constant, gender, marital status, log of salary, and age dummies. The eﬀect of these
variables is allowed to vary between the active-decision and standard-enrollment cohorts. To
test the hypothesis that savings rates are more haphazard under active decisions, we also
allow the variance of the error term to vary across the two cohorts.12
The regression coeﬃcients suggest that in expectation, there is little diﬀerence between
the savings rate an employee chooses immediately after hire under active decisions and the
rate she would have in eﬀect 30 months after hire under standard enrollment. The only
variable we can statistically reject having the same eﬀe c tu n d e rb o t hr e g i m e si sg e n d e r ;a t
our company, women save somewhat less than men under active decisions but not under
standard enrollment. The variance of the error term in the regression is signiﬁcantly smaller
for the active-decision cohort than for the standard-enrollment cohort, suggesting that the
rush of the active-decision deadline does not cause people to make more haphazard savings-
rate decisions.13
In sum, active decisions cause employees to immediately choose a savings rate that on
average they would take up to 30 months to attain under standard enrollment.
3.3 401(k) Asset Allocation
The eﬀect of active decisions on asset allocation cannot be cleanly inferred from the natural
experiment that we study because the menu of investment fund options changed in November
1997, the same time that the company switched from active decisions to the standard-
enrollment regime. Prior to the change, employer stock was only available as an investment
11This estimate is constructed by taking the earliest-available contribution rate (which may be as late as
9 months after hire) for the active-decision employee. Naturally, we set that contribution rate to zero if the
employee had not enrolled in the plan within 3 months of hire.
12To equalize sample selectivity for the two cohorts, we restricted both samples to employees who remain
in our data for 30 months. This is why the number of data points in the regression is less than the total
number of employees in the two cohorts.
13On the other hand, if idiosyncratic variation in the savings rate is primarily due to employees optimally
utilizing private information that is not available to the researchers, then a lower error-term variance could
be consistent with a less well-considered savings decision.
11option for the 14% of participants who made contributions with after-tax money; such after-
tax contributions are infrequent because they do not garner matching contributions at this
company and are generally less tax-eﬃcient than contributions made with pre-tax money.14
During the transition to standard enrollment, employer stock was added as an investment
option for pre-tax 401(k) contributions. Subsequently, the average allocation to employer
stock more than doubled and the average allocation to all other asset classes decreased. It
is impossible to determine how much of this increase was caused by the standard-enrollment
regime, and how much was caused by the roughly seven-fold increase in the fraction of
employees for whom employer stock was a viable investment option.
The impact of active decisions on asset allocation is an important open question, since
employees have low levels of ﬁnancial knowledge about diﬀerent asset classes (John Han-
cock, 2002) and many tend to make poor asset-allocation choices (Benartzi and Thaler,
2001; Cronqvist and Thaler, 2004). We discuss later in the paper why active decisions are
potentially better suited for contribution-rate choices than for asset-allocation choices.15
3.4 401(k) Asset Accumulation
We next consider the impact of active decisions on asset accumulation. Unfortunately, any
asset-accumulation analysis of cohorts who began savings at diﬀerent points in time will be
confounded by time eﬀects, since asset returns are highly volatile. Moreover, as explained
above, the fund menu changed over time, further confounding this analysis. Nonetheless, it is
the level of asset accumulation that will ultimately drive retirement timing and consumption
levels. Studying asset accumulation also gives us insight into whether increased contribution
rates under active decisions are oﬀset by increased 401(k)-loan activity and withdrawals.16
To measure asset accumulation, we divide 401(k) balances by annual base pay. Our mea-
sure of 401(k) balances excludes outstanding principal from 401(k) loans and any balances
an employee rolled over from a previous employer.
Figure 6 reports balance-to-pay ratios at the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of
14Pre-tax contributions are more tax-eﬃcient unless the contributor has a short investment horizon and
expects tax rates to rise sharply in the future.
15We believe that defaults are usually optimal for asset allocation decisions.
16The active-decision cohort did not have 401(k) loans available to them at the time they made their initial
contribution-rate decision. However, after November 1997, they were able to borrow against their 401(k)
balances.
12the balance-to-pay distribution for the active-decision and standard-enrollment cohorts. The
impact of the market downturn in 2001 appears around the 48th month of tenure for the
active-decision cohort and the 36th month of tenure for the standard-enrollment cohort.
It is apparent that the balance-to-pay ratio paths are nearly identical for the two cohorts
at both the 75th and 90th percentiles. In contrast, the 25th percentile active-decision em-
ployee has a much higher balance-to-pay ratio because participation begins two years earlier
in her tenure than it does for the 25th percentile standard-enrollment employee. The 50th
percentile active-decision employee has a slightly higher balance-to-pay ratio, but the eﬀects
of the 2001 stock market downturn muddy the picture. Overall, it appears that active-
decision enrollment only aﬀects asset accumulation in the bottom half of the accumulation
distribution. This is consistent with the results of the contribution rate analysis.
4 A Model of 401(k) Enrollment
The empirical analysis in Section 3 shows that requiring an active decision accelerates 401(k)
enrollment. But these results do not enable us to evaluate the welfare consequences of active
decisions. Active decisions may be harmful if enrolling is a costly action, and there is option
value associated with waiting for a more convenient time to enroll. We now present a
structural model that provides a framework for thinking about socially optimal enrollment
regimes. Each regime is expressed as a default contribution rate in our model. The possible
optimal regimes are standard enrollment (a default contribution rate of 0%), automatic
enrollment (a positive default contribution rate), or active decision (which is conceptually
equivalent to a default so extreme that all employees will choose to opt out immediately).
Our theoretical analysis consists of two parts. The ﬁr s tp a r ti sam o d e lo fp r o c r a s t i n a t i o n
by the individual employee. There are two key features to this model: a stochastically time-
varying transactions cost for opting out of the default, which creates an option value to
waiting; and present bias, which leads to procrastination, so that the employee may fail
to maximize her expected utility. Although we focus on 401(k) enrollment, this model can
be applied to any situation in which an action that generates a positive net utility ﬂow is
delayed by procrastination. The key prediction is that procrastination can generate more
ineﬃciency when the utility ﬂow from acting is small than when the utility ﬂow is large,
since a large utility-ﬂow beneﬁt will motivate an agent to overcome procrastination and act
13immediately.
We then solve the benchmark problem of optimal default-setting by a social planner —
for instance, a regulator that is trying to maximize social surplus).17 We assume that op-
timal savings rates are heterogeneous across employees and only privately observed. These
assumptions are crucial for our welfare results. If the planner knows each employee’s opti-
mum, then the planner can simply set that optimum as the default, sparing the worker the
time and eﬀort of making the choice herself. There is a growing body of evidence that plan-
ners make better asset-allocation choices than workers (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Cronqvist
and Thaler, 2004). However, survey evidence suggests that workers have idiosyncratic sav-
ings needs, and that workers understand this individual variation (Choi et al, 2002). Hence,
the model that follows is best applied to savings-rate choices, where individuals have superior
information about their optimum, and not to asset-allocation choices, where outside experts
might have superior information (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Cronqvist and Thaler, 2004).
4.1 The Sophisticated Employee’s Problem
We model the employee as an agent who suﬀers a potential utility loss of L ≥ 0 at the
beginning of each period until she takes some action. In our particular application, the
relevant action is opting out of the 401(k) default contribution rate and moving to a (per-
sonally) preferred contribution rate. This action entails an immediate transactions cost
which is a random variable whose density function f(c) is continuous with support [c,¯ c]
(where 0 <c< ¯ c).18
In every period, the agent ﬁrst experiences a ﬂow loss of L, a n dt h e ns h ed r a w sac o s tc
from the transaction cost distribution. (We assume costs are independent across periods.)
She then decides whether to take action. If she takes action, she incurs an immediate cost
of c but incurs no further ﬂow losses. If she does not take action, she faces another loss of
L at the beginning of the next period, and the game continues. In the 401(k) enrollment
context, L represents the net disutility per period due to either oversaving or undersaving at
17In reality, any institution with default-setting power may have complex motives that extend beyond
maximizing social welfare.
18When ¯ c = ∞, much of the same analysis goes through with technical adjustments. If the distribution
of c has a ﬁnite mean, the results are very similar, but active decisions (discussed in Section 4.3) must be
treated as a separate option rather than an extreme default. If the distribution is suﬃciently fat-tailed that
the mean of the cost distribution is inﬁnite, then active decisions are no longer a candidate for the optimum,
since they impose an inﬁnite average cost.
14the default contribution rate (relative to her personal optimal contribution rate). We assume
for simplicity that L is constant over time.
The agent has quasi-hyperbolic preferences (Phelps and Pollak 1968, Laibson 1997): she
has a long-term discount factor δ and an additional short-term discount factor β,w h e r e
β,δ ∈ (0,1]. Thus, if her utility in periods 0,1,2,...is u0,u 1,u 2,..., then her intertemporal
utility from the point of view of self t is Ut = ut +β(δut+1 +δ
2ut+2 +δ
3ut+3 +···). If β<1,
this gives rise to dynamic inconsistency. The agent’s behavior is modeled as an extensive-
form game among the various period-t selves, for all t ≥ 0.T h e p e r i o d - t self’s payoﬀ is Ut.
We assume for now that the agent is a sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounter, meaning
t h a tt h ev a l u e so fβ and δ are common knowledge among the various selves.
In any strategy proﬁle, we can deﬁne the payoﬀ of the period-t self if she chooses not to
take action.19 It is then clear that she will take action if and only if she draws a cost c less
than this payoﬀ. That is, the strategy in each period is to determine a cutoﬀ cost c∗,a n d
take action if and only if c<c ∗.W e c o n ﬁne our analysis to stationary equilibria, where the
cutoﬀ c∗ is the same in each period. In the exposition below, we defer most proofs to the
appendix.
Proposition 1 The agent’s game has a unique stationary equilibrium:
• if L ≤ c(1 − δ)/βδ,t h e nc∗ = c (the agent never acts);
• if L ≥ ¯ c/βδ −E(c),t h e nc∗ =¯ c (the agent acts immediately no matter what the cost);
• otherwise, c∗ is the unique solution to the equation
c





In fact, one can show that if β is not too low, this is the only equilibrium of the game;
there are no non-stationary equilibria. The appendix contains some further discussion.
We are interested not only in the agent’s behavior but also in the resulting welfare
consequences. We take as our normative welfare measure the expression u0+δu1+δ
2u2+···,
the stream of losses as discounted with the exponential discount factor δ.L e tφ denote the
19We only study Markov strategies–in other words, strategies that depend only on payoﬀ-relevant infor-
mation. In particular, this excludes equilibria in which the agent’s period t strategy depends on the costs
drawn in earlier periods.
15expectation of this value.20 If the worker’s ﬁr s tc o s td r a wi sl e s st h a nc∗, then her total
realized loss is c; otherwise, she incurs an expected loss of L + φ starting from the next







E(c|c<c ∗)P(c<c ∗)+δL· P(c>c ∗)
1 − δP(c>c ∗)
. (2)
When c∗ = c,w eh a v eφ = Lδ/(1−δ);w h e nc∗ =¯ c,w eh a v eφ = E(c). The intermediate
region is of most interest.
W es u m m a r i z es o m es i m p l ec o m p a r a t i v es t a t i c so nc∗ and φ. We assume that δ and the
distribution of c are given, and consider variation in β and L.
Proposition 2 1. In the region where c <c ∗ < ¯ c, c∗ is strictly increasing in L and β.
2. φ is weakly decreasing in β.
3. If β =1 ,t h e nφ is weakly increasing in L. However, if β<1, then there exist values
of L for which φ>E (c).
4. If δ =1and β is suﬃciently low, then φ ≥ E(c) for all L 6=0 .
For time-consistent agents (β =1 ), a higher ﬂow loss L always implies a weakly higher
expected total loss φ. However, agents with β<1 will set a lower action threshold c∗ than
agents with β =1 , and thus will take longer to act on average. We think of this incremental
delay as procrastination. Part 2 of the preceding proposition shows that procrastination
leads to lower welfare. In particular, Part 3 shows that there exist some values of L such
that the agent’s expected losses are larger than the average transactions cost. This implies
that an agent facing such an L would actually be better oﬀ if L were increased to the point
that she would be motivated to take action immediately. Part 4 gives a stronger result:
when δ =1and time-inconsistency is suﬃciently strong, the agent is always better oﬀ being
forced to act immediately if he is not already at his optimum.
20To motivate this long-run perspective, it is enough to assume that regulations established by the planner
in period t take eﬀect in period t+1. Then every worker at every point in time will want the planner to set
the policy that minimizes φ.
16For “reasonable” shapes of the transactions cost distribution, the total expected loss φ is
a single-peaked function of L when β<1, rising for low L and then falling, but this is not
always true.21
To illustrate Proposition 2, Figure 7 graphs the expected total loss φ as a function of L
for various parameter sets in the case where c is uniformly distributed. When L is close to
zero, the expected loss is always increasing in L.W h e n L is suﬃciently large, the worker
will always immediately opt out of the default at any cost (c∗ =¯ c) and never incur any ﬂow
losses. Thus for large L, the total loss is E(c), which is independent of L;t h i si sw h yt h e
graphs ﬂatten out on the right.
When β =1( t h el e f tg r a p hi nF i g u r e7 ) ,φ is always weakly increasing as L moves away
from zero; time-consistent workers are always weakly better oﬀ with a smaller ﬂow loss.
But when β<1 (the middle graph in Figure 7), there is an intermediate region in which
φ(L) >E (c) (part 3 of Proposition 2). Workers in the “hump” of the loss function would be
better oﬀ if L were much larger. A larger ﬂo wl o s si sak i c ki nt h ep a n t st h a tc a u s e sw o r k e r s
to overcome procrastination.
When L is suﬃciently close to (but not equal to) 0, never opting out of the default will
be the eﬃcient choice when δ<1. For these employees, even if they were perfectly time-
consistent, the perpetual stream of losses would not be serious enough to warrant incurring
the opt-out cost. In this region, φ increases linearly with L. The region vanishes as δ → 1
or c → 0.I n t h e c a s e δ =1 ,i fβ is suﬃciently low (the right graph in Figure 7), then
all employees except those at L =0are made weakly better oﬀ by being forced to act
immediately; this is part 4 of Proposition 2.
4.2 The Planner’s Optimization Problem
We now describe the problem of a social planner. Suppose that each worker has a private
optimal savings rate s. Over the population of workers, s has some distribution with density
g(s) and compact support [s, ¯ s]. Workers who prefer not to be enrolled in the 401(k) have
s close to 0,o rs<0 if they would like to dissave. The planner sets a default savings rate
21A necessary and suﬃcient condition for φ to have this shape is that β<1 and either the equation
c∗f(c∗)=P(c>c ∗)/(1 − β) has exactly one solution in (c,¯ c), or else it has no solution and δ<1.T h i s
can be veriﬁed using the computation of dφ/dc∗ given in the proof of Lemma 7 in the appendix, and by the
observation that when δ<1, φ is always increasing for suﬃciently small values of L where the agent never
opts out. In particular, the condition is satisﬁed when c is uniformly distributed and β is not too low.
17d. Each worker would like to be at her optimal savings rate s and suﬀers a utility loss L for
each period in which she remains at the default d if s 6= d. Workers probabilisticly opt out
of the default and set their savings rate to their personal optimum s, according to the model
described in the previous section.
We assume that L depends only on the diﬀerence ∆ = s − d.L e tL = l(∆),a n da s s u m e
• l is continuous;
• l(∆) is decreasing on (−∞,0) and increasing on (0,∞);
• l(0) = 0,a n dl →∞as ∆ → ±∞.
We assume for simplicity that all workers have the same (β,δ) and distribution of trans-
actions costs; only s varies across workers. We can unambiguously write the individual
worker’s expected total loss as φ(l(s − d)), which we more succinctly call Φ(s − d).I f t h e
default is suﬃciently far outside of [s, ¯ s], then all workers are guaranteed to opt out of the
default immediately. Such a default is equivalent to an active-decision regime, where workers
are required to choose their optimal savings rate immediately.
These additional assumptions on L make the model of the individual employee opera-
tional enough that we can check if it ﬁts the data reasonably well. We had assumed that
each individual’s L is time-invariant. If L = l(∆) and the default d is ﬁxed, then the opti-
mal savings rate s must also be ﬁxed. This is consistent with Figure 5 and Table 3, which
showed that the contribution rate employees choose when forced to immediately state their
preference is similar to the contribution rate they would have eventually chosen under stan-
dard enrollment–implying that the optimal savings rate shortly after hire is similar to the
optimum at higher tenures.
The individual employee model also predicts that as L increases, the average time to
opting out decreases. Figure 8 shows that the data support this prediction. In the standard-
enrollment cohort — i.e. the case d =0— the mean days between hire and enrollment
decreases with s (the contribution rate chosen by the worker when they enroll), and hence
with s − d.
The planner’s problem is to choose d to minimize
Z ¯ s
s
g(s)Φ(s − d)ds. (3)
18Compactness ensures an optimum exists. Importantly, we are assuming that the planner
cannot observe individuals’ optimal savings rates and only knows the density function g(s).
Otherwise, the planner could simply default each employee into her own optimal savings rate
s.
I nt h es i m p l ec a s ew h e r et h eo p t i m a ls a v i n g sr a t es is uniformly distributed, the planner’s
optimization problem is to minimize the integral of Φ from s−d to ¯ s−d – that is, to pick
out the “window” of width ¯ s − s in which the integral of Φ is lowest. The position of the
window is determined by d. For more general distributions of s, the problem is similar, but
now diﬀerent parts of the window may be weighted diﬀerently.
As with the ﬁrst part of our model (the employee’s decision), we have described the prob-
lem of optimal defaults in the context of 401(k) plans, but a similar setup could be applied
to any context in which a planner must choose a default. It is also worth mentioning that
the default-setting problem interacts with the employee’s problem only through the function
φ, whose relevant qualitative features are summarized in Proposition 2. In particular, we
will study how the value of β aﬀects the optimal choice of default, but our results will not
depend on the details of how the employee’s behavior is modeled. For example, if β were
a parameter describing status quo bias (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1994; Samuelson
and Zeckhauser, 1988) rather than discounting, similar results would obtain.
4.3 Optimality of Active Decisions
Our analysis can be used to determine the optimality of an active-decision regime. Since the
aggregate welfare loss from such a regime is E(c), the question boils down to whether there
exists d so that (3) is less than E(c).
There are ﬁve parameters in our model: the discounting parameters β,δ; the loss func-
tion l; and the distributions of transactions costs and optimal savings rates (f and g,r e -
spectively). The following two propositions state that regions of the parameter space where
active decisions are optimal tend to be regions where time-inconsistency is stronger.
Proposition 3 If active decisions are optimal at some value of the parameters, then if β is
lowered (and everything else remains the same), active decisions are still optimal.
19Proof. The statement that active decisions are optimal means that, for every choice of d,
Z ¯ s
s
g(s)Φ(s − d)ds ≥ E(c). (4)
By Proposition 2, when β decreases, Φ(s − d) can only increase, so the left side of (4) can
only increase, and the inequality stays true.
Proposition 4 Hold δ,f,and l ﬁxed. If β is suﬃciently close to 1, then for any distribution
of optimal savings rates, active decisions are never optimal.
An intuitive companion result would be that whenever β is low enough, active decisions
a r ea l w a y so p t i m a l . T h i si st r u ei fδ =1 .H o w e v e r , i f δ<1,n e v e ro p t i n go u tm a yb e
optimal for agents if the default is already very close to their s. Hence, if the population is
highly concentrated near one point, it may be optimal to make that point the default rather
than forcing everybody to opt out immediately. The next proposition states these results
formally.
Proposition 5 Fix f, l, and δ.
1. Suppose δ =1 .I fβ is suﬃciently low, then active decisions are always optimal.
2. Suppose δ<1.I f¯ s − s is suﬃciently small, then the optimal default will always lie
between s and ¯ s (so the optimum is not active decisions).
We will sometimes refer to defaults d ∈ [s, ¯ s] as internal defaults.
In the case where δ<1,i ti sd i ﬃcult to be more precise about whether or not active
decisions are optimal; we need some parameter that measures, in the relevant way, how
homogeneous the population’s optimal savings rates s are. If we impose the structural
restriction that s is uniformly distributed–an assumption we will maintain in the next
section–then we can be more speciﬁc:
Proposition 6 Fix f, l,a n dδ<1.I fs is uniformly distributed, then there exists a bound
w∗ with the following property: when β is suﬃciently low, active decisions are optimal when
¯ s − s >w ∗, and an internal default is optimal when ¯ s − s <w ∗.
20The message of these last two propositions is that when β is low, active decisions will
typically be optimal, except when preferences are concentrated.
When active decisions are not optimal, there typically is a range of diﬀerent optimal
default regimes. In order to give an explicit description of these regimes that maps intuitively
into 401(k) enrollment mechanisms used in practice, we need to impose more structure on
the model. We do this in the next subsection.
4.4 Characterizing Optimal Default Policies
We now assume that transactions costs are uniformly distributed on the interval [c,¯ c],a n d
optimal savings rates are uniformly distributed on [s, ¯ s]. This puts parametric structure on
f and g. For the loss function l, we assume l(∆)=κ · ∆2,w h e r eκ>0 is some constant.22
Finally, we assume for the remainder of this section that δ =1 .23
In this case, we can describe the shape of the expected total loss function Φ. The function
is symmetric around ∆ =0because of the functional form assumption on l(∆).T w oo t h e r
properties are stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 7 Under the assumptions of this section,
• If 2 − ¯ c/c <β<1,t h e r ee x i s t0 < ∆m < ¯ ∆ such that Φ(∆) is increasing on [0,∆m],
decreasing on [∆m, ¯ ∆], and constant at E(c)=( c +¯ c)/2 on [¯ ∆,∞].
• If β ≤ 2−¯ c/c, then there exists ¯ ∆ such that Φ(∆) is decreasing on (0, ¯ ∆] and constant
at E(c) on [¯ ∆,∞].
The explicit values are given in the appendix. Figure 9 graphs Φ for three sets of para-
meter values. (Ignore the shading in the ﬁgure for now.) When β =1(the left panel), Φ
is (weakly) monotonically increasing in |∆|;t h i si si m m e d i a t e l yg i v e nb yP r o p o s i t i o n2 .F o r
“typical” parameter values when β<1, Φ has the two humps shown in the middle and right
22In ﬁrms that match employee 401(k) contributions up to a threshold, the utility-loss function may be
kinked at this threshold (which may or may not coincide with the worker’s optimum). In this case, our
analytically convenient loss function is unrealistic.
23When δ<1, the results are similar, but for certain parameter values there may exist a fourth type of
default aside from the three mentioned in Proposition 8. We avoid this case because it makes the algebra
signiﬁcantly more complex without oﬀering new economic insights.
21panels. If the range of transactions costs is small and β is low, then Φ is strictly decreasing
as ∆ moves away from 0, and there is only one hump. (This case is not shown in Figure 9.)
It follows by continuity that there will be at most one value ∆e ∈ (0, ¯ ∆) such that
Φ(∆e)=E(c). (The value of ∆e is given in the appendix.) The middle panel of Figure 9
is an example where such a ∆e value does exist in the inner region of the right hump (with
as y m m e t r i c−∆e value in the inner region of the left hump). If β is suﬃciently low, then
lim∆→0Φ(∆) ≥ E(c), and no such ∆e will exist, as in the right panel of Figure 9.
The following proposition shows that when β<1, we can classify the planner’s solution
into one of three cases.
Proposition 8 If β<1, then the optimal default is one of the following three types:
• the center default d =( s +¯ s)/2;
• an oﬀset default,s u c ht h a ts−d = −∆e while ¯ s−d>¯ ∆ (or its symmetric equivalent,
¯ s − d = ∆e and s − d<−¯ ∆);
• active decisions, which correspond to any d with s − d ≥ ¯ ∆ or ¯ s − d ≤−¯ ∆.
A detailed proof is in the appendix, but a sketch is as follows. We ﬁr s ts h o wt h a ti f
0 <a<band Φ(a)=Φ(b),t h e n|Φ0(b)| > |Φ0(a)|; that is, the outer portion of the
humps is steeper than the inner portion. Next, the ﬁrst-order condition for d is simply that
Φ(s−d)=Φ(¯ s−d), leading to a ﬁnite number of candidate optima. Finally, using the above
fact about the slope of Φ on the humps, we show that any d outside the three classes cited
would fail to satisfy the second-order condition.
The possible optimal defaults correspond to the diﬀerent panels of Figure 9. The area
of the shaded regions equals the total population welfare loss from the chosen default, and
their width equals ¯ s − s. The left panel shows the center default, which sets the default at
the mean of the population s distribution. The middle panel shows the oﬀset default, which
in this case is to the left of the mean s (there is a symmetric oﬀset default to the right of the
mean s). The oﬀset default is placed so that workers with the lowest optimal savings rate,
s, opt out with some probability less than 1 in the ﬁrst period, but procrastination causes
their expected welfare loss to exactly equal the expected welfare loss if they were forced to
opt out with certainty in the ﬁrst period. The oﬀset default also causes workers with the
22highest optimal savings rate, ¯ s, to opt out with certainty in the ﬁrst period because the
default is far away from their optimum. If ¯ s − s is not large enough for the two extremes
of the population to act in this manner, then the oﬀset default is not a candidate for the
optimal default. Finally, the right panel of Figure 9 shows an active-decision regime, where
the default is set so far outside of the support of s that all individuals opt out of the default
immediately and incur expected welfare losses of E(c).
Figure 10 shows how the optimal default depends on two parameters in our model: β
(the time-inconsistency factor) and ¯ s − s (the heterogeneity of optimal savings rates). We
d i s c u s se a c hr e g i o ni nt u r n .
First consider the southeast region of Figure 10. In this region, employees have weak
dynamic inconsistency problems and relatively homogeneous savings rates. The socially
optimal solution here is a center default. This puts all employees in the middle of the graph
of the function Φ, where the resulting losses are low.
As β falls, the humps in the graph of Φ grow, and eventually, a center default puts so
m a n yw o r k e r si nt h eh u m p st h a ti ti sn ol o n g e ro p t i m a l .O n c eβ is low enough, the losses
from procrastination are large relative to the option value of waiting for a low cost, and
employees are better on average if they are forced to opt out of the default immediately.
Thus, active decisions are optimal in this region.
When β is high–so that the humps are not too large–and employees are very hetero-
geneous, the best solution is an oﬀset default, which puts employees into the valley between
the humps, one hump, and a plateau, rather than in both humps, the valley, and possibly the
plateaus, as would be the case with a center default. Under an oﬀset default, some employees
(but not all) are so far from their optimal savings rate that they are compelled to opt out of
the default immediately. The oﬀset default is thus a compromise between the active-decision
and center solutions. By using an oﬀset default, the planner beneﬁcially moves population
mass from one of the humps to a plateau, while still letting those with optimal rates near
the new default exploit the option value of waiting.
The following proposition shows that the regions of Figure 10 generically have the shape
shown.
Proposition 9 Fix κ, c, and ¯ c. Then there exist values 0 <β ac <β oc < 1,a n daf u n c t i o n
w :( βac,1] → (0,∞], with the following properties:
1. for β ≤ βac, active decisions are always optimal;
232. for βac <β<β oc, active decisions are optimal when ¯ s−s >w (β) and a center default
is optimal when ¯ s − s <w (β);
3. for βoc <β<1,a no ﬀset default is optimal when ¯ s−s >w (β) and a center default is
optimal when ¯ s − s <w (β);
4. w is increasing on (βac,βoc].
T h eb o u n d a r i e so ft h er e g i o n si nF i g u r e1 0a r e ,i ng e n e r a l ,d i ﬃcult to describe explicitly.
Notice however that the boundary between the active-decision and oﬀset default region is
a vertical line. This is because, for both of these policies, some of the workers are in the
plateaus of the function Φ.I ft h er a n g eo fs widens slightly, the marginal employees (at the
boundary of the support of ∆) will be in the plateau under either regime, so increasing the
range of s cannot make one regime more attractive than the other.
The case β =1is an exception. In this case, the function Φ has no humps. When the
r a n g eo fs a v i n g sr a t e si sl o w ,ac e n t e rd e f a u l ti so p t i m a l .W h e ns a v i n g sr a t e sa r ew i d ee n o u g h
to cover the whole valley in the graph of Φ, then any default that is suﬃciently far inside
the interval [s, ¯ s] to take full advantage of the valley will be optimal. More precisely:
Proposition 10 Fix κ, c,a n d¯ c,a n da s s u m eβ =1 .L e t¯ ∆ be the smallest positive value
with Φ(¯ ∆)=E(c).T h e n
• if ¯ s − s ≤ 2¯ ∆, then the center default d =( ¯ s + s)/2 is the unique optimum;
• otherwise, the set of optimal defaults consists of all d ∈ [s + ¯ ∆, ¯ s − ¯ ∆].
We should also mention that although we have focused on β and ¯ s−s as the parameters
of interest, we also get information about the eﬀect of κ,t h eﬂow loss coeﬃcient, for free. It
is easy to check that scaling κ by some positive factor λ has exactly the same eﬀect on the
planner’s optimization problem as scaling s, ¯ s, and d all by
√
λ.
4.5 The Case of Naive Workers
We brieﬂy return to our more general problem, without the distributional assumptions of the
Section 4.4, to discuss an extension. Our analysis to this point has assumed that workers are
sophisticated and understand their own time-inconsistency. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a,
24b) have considered naive and partially naive agents. Such agents believe their future selves
will act with some short-term discount factor b β>β .24 In the case of total naiveté, b β =1 ,
agents simply plan a strategy for all future periods that maximizes their current self’s utility
and then best-respond to this strategy in the current period, ignoring the fact that future
selves will not want to follow the strategy that was naively forecast for them.
As one would expect, for a ﬁxed β, naive agents do worse than sophisticated agents. The
more naive the agent is, the less she expects to lose in the future, and the lower she sets
her cutoﬀ cost threshold c∗, which in turn makes her actual losses even higher. The next
proposition states this formally.
Proposition 11 I nt h ee m p l o y e em o d e l ,i ff, β, δ, and L are held ﬁxed, then c∗ is (weakly)
decreasing in b β,a n dφ is (weakly) increasing in b β.
This leads immediately to the following corollary for the social planner:
Corollary 12 If active decisions are optimal at given parameter values, then they remain
optimal when b β is increased.
Proof. Exactly the same argument as for Proposition 3.
In the extreme case δ =1 , naiveté has some perverse consequences. In particular,
sophisticated agents will always set c∗ >c(unless their ﬂow loss L is zero). However, naive
agents with L suﬃciently close to 0 will never bother taking action. They expect themselves
to take action at some point in the future, and they therefore see no need to act now even
i ft h ec o s ti sl o w .
Proposition 13 Fix f, β, b β.A s s u m eδ =1 .F o ra l ls u ﬃciently small L, the agent will set
c∗ = c.25
Since δ =1 , the total loss φ incurred will be inﬁnite. (This phenomenon is also discussed
in O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999b.)
This implies that the analysis of our special case (c and s uniformly distributed) is
quite diﬀerent when employees are naive. In this case, an internal default is never optimal
24More precisely, for the equilibrium problem to be well-deﬁned, we must assume that for each t,t h e
period-t self believes all future selves are sophisticated (b β,δ)-discounters. We also continue to assume that
the agent expects her future selves to follow a stationary equilibrium.
25Since f is a continuous density function, setting c∗ = c implies that the agent never acts.
25b e c a u s ei tc a u s e si n ﬁnite losses for some agents (unlike active decisions). This result may
seem artiﬁcial since δ =1is an extreme case in our model. But even if we assume δ<1,
so that the losses are ﬁnite, similar reasoning will show that internal defaults are still not
eﬃcient when δ is close enough to 1. In some cases, the optimal default is neither internal
nor active decisions, but a default outside the support of s which does not induce everybody
to opt out immediately.
4.6 Delayed Active-Decision Regimes
One more variation we have considered, and which we will discuss only brieﬂy, is that of
delayed active decisions. In such a regime, the agent knows in period 0 that she must act
(and incur the corresponding cost E(c) on average) in period T i fs h eh a sn o ta l r e a d ya c t e d
before period T. This deadline, T,may be inﬁnite or some ﬁnite, nonnegative integer. T =0
is simply the active decision regime that we have already analyzed (the employee must act in
the initial period). The employee’s problem in the ﬁnite-T case is analogous to the inﬁnite-T
case.
From the social planner’s point of view, a delayed active-decision regime means that the
planner sets both a default savings rate d and a deadline T. The active-decision regime at
our study company might be described as such a regime, since employees were given 30 days
to turn in their forms, rather than being required to turn them in immediately upon joining
the company. Intuitively, these regimes have the appeal that they oﬀer some of the option
value of waiting without allowing procrastinators to incur excessively large losses.
We do not have a general theory of the planner’s solution in situations where T can be
positive but ﬁnite. However, we do have one result which is surprising in light of the intuition
described in the last paragraph:
Theorem 14 If costs are uniformly distributed, and (β,δ) is homogeneous over the popula-
tion, then delayed active-decision regimes with ﬁnite positive T are never better than T = ∞
regimes.
This holds for any distribution of optimal savings rates. In fact, this holds even if the
default d is held ﬁxed; that is, for any distribution of L over the employees (where each
individual’s L is held ﬁxed), the socially optimal value of T is either ∞ or 0.
26The proof is fairly involved, so we omit it here. The key step is that, for each individual,
φT(L), the agent’s loss under a T-period regime, converges to φ(L) as T →∞ ,b u tt h e
convergence is faster for individuals with φ(L) >E (c) than for those with φ(L) <E (c).
That is, those individuals who beneﬁt from active decisions (“ineﬃcient” types) converge
faster than those who are better oﬀ b e i n gl e f tt oa c to nt h e i ro w n( “ e ﬃcient” types). So
suppose that T =0is better than T = ∞ for aggregate welfare, so that the ineﬃcient types
outweigh the eﬃcient types. Then, for any positive T, the diﬀerential rates of convergence
imply that the losses to the ineﬃcient types (relative to T =0 ) exceed the gains to the
eﬃcient types, and no such T can be better than T =0 . On the other hand, suppose T = ∞
is better than T =0for welfare, so that the eﬃcient types outweigh the ineﬃcient types.
Then, for any ﬁnite T, the losses to the eﬃcient types (relative to T = ∞) outweigh the
gains to the ineﬃcient types, and no such T can be better than T = ∞.
5M o d e l D i s c u s s i o n
We now link our theoretical results to actual institutions. We classify actual 401(k) en-
rollment regimes into three types: a standard enrollment 401(k), an automatic enrollment
401(k), and an active decision 401(k).26
Under a standard enrollment 401(k), employees have a default savings rate of zero and are
given the option to raise this savings rate. Under an automatic enrollment 401(k), employees
h a v ead e f a u l ts a v i n g sr a t et h a ti ss t r i c t l yp o s i t i v ea n da r eg i v e nt h eo p t i o nt oc h a n g et h a t
savings rate (including opting out of the plan altogether). Under an active decision 401(k),
employees face no default and instead must aﬃrmatively pick a savings rate (which includes
the option of saving nothing at all).
In the analysis of our model–see Section 4.4–we found three types of optimal regimes:
an oﬀset default, a center default, and active decision. The standard-enrollment 401(k) is an
example of an oﬀset default, since a 0% savings rate lies at one end of the optimal savings-
rate distribution.27 The automatic enrollment 401(k) may either be an oﬀset default or a
26Contribution escalation (see Thaler and Benartzi, 2004), in which the savings rate increases automatically
with some periodicity, is another way in which automatic enrollment is sometimes implemented, and is also
included as an opt-in feature in some standard-enrollment 401(k) plans; we do not incorporate the additional
complexity of a potentially increasing savings rate here.
27The standard-enrollment default savings rate is on the boundary of the action space, but this location
is consistent with the concept of an oﬀset default if savings preferences cross the boundary because some
27center default, depending on where the default is set.28 Finally, the active decision 401(k)
of the ﬁrm studied in the ﬁrst half of this paper translates directly into the active decision
regime derived in our model.
When we calibrate our stylized model we ﬁnd that active decision regimes are optimal
for β values below 0.6 in the sophisticated case and for β values below 0.9 in the naive case.
These are plausible values for β,29 so the calibrations imply that active decisions might be
socially optimal institutions.
However, such calibrations are only suggestive. To make a compelling quantitative argu-
ment we would need a model that was less stylized and more closely tied to deep preference
parameters. Hence, a quantitatively meaningful calibration exercise is beyond the scope of
the current paper. For such a calibration, we would need a way of estimating the ﬂow losses
from sticking to the default. We also need to estimate the density of optimal savings rates,
g(s).
Qualitatively, however, we can conclude that three factors robustly strengthen the case
for active decision enrollment: greater present bias (lower β), greater naivite, and greater
heterogeneity in savings preferences
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper analyzes the active-decision alternative to default-based 401(k) enrollment processes.
The active-decision approach forces employees to explicitly choose between the options of
enrollment and non-enrollment in the 401(k) plan without advantaging either outcome.
We ﬁnd that the fraction of employees who enroll in the 401(k) three months after hire is
28 percentage points greater under an active-decision regime than under a standard opt-in en-
rollment regime. The active-decision regime also raises average saving rates and accumulated
401(k) balances. The distribution of new employees’ savings rates under active decisions is
similar to the distribution it takes 30 months to achieve under standard enrollment.
households would like to dissave.
28Proﬁt Sharing/401(k) Council of America (2001) reports that three-quarters of companies with automatic
enrollment set their default contribution rate at 2% or 3% of pay, which is much lower than the 7% average
401(k) savings rate selected by employees when they make an aﬃrmative choice (Holden and VanDerhei,
2001). However, over the next few years the distribution of default savings rates under automatic enrollment
will rise as a result of the passage of the Pension Protection Act.
29See Angeletos et al (2001), and Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2007) for estimates of β.
28We also present a general model of procrastination which describes the employee’s choice
of a 401(k) contribution rate. Using this framework, we characterize the socially optimal
401(k) regime. The active-decision regime is optimal when workers have relatively heteroge-
neous savings preferences and a relatively strong tendency to procrastinate.
An active-decision regime has both pros and cons. On the plus side, it is inexpensive
to implement, it eliminates costly procrastination, and it pushes heterogeneous workers to
choose personally optimal contribution rates. Requiring individuals to make an active de-
cision represents an alternative to the paternalism associated with a planner’s choice of a
default. Active-decision interventions are designed principally to force a decision-maker to
think about a problem. This is still a type of paternalism, but it does not presuppose a
leading answer to the decision problem.30
On the con side, active decisions force workers to engage in a costly decision/implementation
process that might be ineﬃcient if a single default would have done a good job for most
workers. Likewise, active decisions may force ﬁnancially unsophisticated workers to make
uninformed decisions.
Active-decision interventions will be useful in situations where consumer heterogeneity
implies that one choice isn’t ideal for everyone (e.g., the selection of a health plan or au-
tomobile insurance31)a n dﬁrms or governments feel uncomfortable implementing employee-
speciﬁc defaults (e.g., if such employee-speciﬁc defaults are viewed as “advice” with ﬁduciary
consequences).32 In contrast, defaults will have a natural role to play in cases where a large
degree of homogeneity is appropriate and/or household decision-makers have limited exper-
tise (e.g., portfolio allocation).33 Future research should explore active-decision experiments
in other domains and compare the relative eﬃcacy of active-decision and default-based sys-
tems, as well as hybrid systems which integrate their features.34
30We view active decisions as an example of libertarian paternalism (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003).
31The active-decision approach to purchasing automobile insurance is widely used. Drivers cannot, in
general, register their cars without obtaining insurance. But the government does not specify a default
insurance contract for drivers; rather, it requires drivers to obtain their own insurance–to make an active
decision. The model in the paper suggests that there is a good justiﬁcation for this approach: there is likely
to be substantial heterogeneity in individual preferences over insurance policy types and companies.
32An example of an intriguing employee-speciﬁc default is a default savings rate that increases with the
employee’s age.
33See Benartzi and Thaler (2003) and Cronqvist and Thaler (2004) for evidence on poor asset allocation
choices.
34For instance, the contribution rate in a 401(k) could be an active decision and the asset allocation could
be a default.
297 Appendix
7.1 The Sophisticated Employee’s Problem
We are concerned mainly with identifying all stationary equilibria of the game, where a ﬁxed
cutoﬀ c∗ is used in all periods. As in the main text, we let φ be the expected total utility
loss over all periods, discounted using the exponential factor δ only. Thus φ is given by the






(If c∗ = c and δ =1 , then we set φ = ∞ for L>0 and φ =0for L =0 .) The cutoﬀ c∗ will
be chosen so that that the agent is indiﬀerent between incurring transactions cost c∗ and






c if βδ(L + φ) <c
βδ(L + φ) if c ≤ βδ(L + φ) ≤ ¯ c
¯ c if βδ(L + φ) > ¯ c.
Now we can prove the proposition identifying the stationary equilibrium, which we restate
here.
Proposition 1 The agent’s game has a unique stationary equilibrium:
• if L ≤ c(1 − δ)/βδ,t h e nc∗ = c (the agent never acts);
• if L ≥ ¯ c/βδ−E(c),t h e nc∗ =¯ c (the agent acts immediately no matter what the cost);
• otherwise, c∗ is the unique solution to the equation
c





Proof. The cases of the proposition do not overlap, since c(1 − δ)/βδ < ¯ c/βδ − E(c).( T o
see this, note that c(1 − δ)/βδ < E(c)(1 − δ)/βδ ≤ E(c)/βδ − E(c) < ¯ c/βδ − E(c).)
When is c∗ = c an equilibrium? This cutoﬀ produces losses of φ = δL/(1 − δ).T h i s
is an equilibrium if and only if this value of φ gives βδ(L + φ) ≤ c, which is equivalent to
L ≤ c(1 − δ)/βδ.
30Likewise, a cutoﬀ of c∗ =¯ c yields φ = E(c). This cutoﬀ is an equilibrium if and only if
βδ(L + φ) ≥ ¯ c, which is equivalent to L ≥ ¯ c/βδ − E(c).
Finally, any given value of c∗ in the middle is an equilibrium if and only if c∗ = βδ(L+φ),
where φ is given by (2). This equation expands to c∗ = βδ(L + E(c|c<c ∗)P(c<c ∗))/(1 −
δP(c>c ∗)). Clearing the denominator and rearranging gives (5).







To complete the existence-uniqueness proof, we need to check that equation (5), which states
that c∗ = g(c∗), has exactly one solution on (c,¯ c) if c(1 − δ)/βδ < L < ¯ c/βδ − E(c),a n d
none otherwise.







In particular, g0(c∗) ≤ δP(c>c ∗) ≤ 1, with equality possible only if c∗ = c and δ =1 .T h i s
implies that g(c∗)=c∗ has one root in (c,¯ c) if g(c) >cand g(¯ c) < ¯ c, and no root otherwise.
Since g(c)=βδL+ δc and g(¯ c)=βδ(L + E(c)), the result follows.
What happens if we no longer limit ourselves to stationary equilibria? There is now a
separate cutoﬀ c∗
t in each period t, and a separate total loss φt obtained by δ-discounting all








and the indiﬀerence condition is c∗
t = βδ(L + φt+1) (with the same truncation as before at
c and ¯ c). Combining these, we get c∗
t = g(c∗
t+1) (truncated to [c,¯ c]), where g is the same
function as above. (There is some extra subtlety when c∗
t+1 = c, which we omit here.)
If |g0(c∗)| < 1 for all c∗, except possibly at the endpoints c and ¯ c, then contraction
mapping theory tells us that the intersection of the images of the iterates g,g2,g 3,... consists
of a single point. All the c∗
t lie in all of these images, so they are all equal to this point.
Hence, if g0 satisﬁes this condition, the only possible equilibrium is the stationary one.






then the condition on g0 is met, and so the stationary equilibrium is the only equilib-
rium. On the other hand, if β is too low, then there may be cyclical equilibria. The
no-cyclical-equilibria condition may or may not be met for “most” values of β, depending
on the distribution of c. For example, if c is uniformly distributed, the condition reduces to
β>1 − 1/[δ(1 − c/¯ c)], which holds for typical β if the range of transactions costs is wide
and δ is high.
We derive an important corollary to Proposition 1:
Corollary 15 The cutoﬀ c∗ of the stationary equilibrium is a continuous function of β,δ,
and L, and it is diﬀerentiable except at the boundaries L = c(1−δ)/βδ and L =¯ c/βδ−E(c).
The same holds for φ, except that it is discontinuous when δ =1and L =0 .
Proof. Continuity of c∗ at the boundary points is straightforward to check. Diﬀerentia-
bility of c∗ away from the boundary points is easily checked by writing out c∗ = g(c∗) and
diﬀerentiating implicitly with respect to each of the parameters (on which the value of g
depends). Continuity and diﬀerentiability of φ then follow from equation (2), except that
the denominator becomes zero when δ =1and c∗ = c (which occurs if and only if L =0 ),
so we cannot infer anything there. Indeed, if δ =1 , we have a discontinuity at L =0 :w e
have set φ =0for L =0 , but for any nonzero L, c∗ >c , so the agent will eventually act and
incur expected costs ≥ c.
Next, we prove our comparative statics on c∗ and φ.
Proposition 2
1. On the region where c <c ∗ < ¯ c, c∗ is strictly increasing in L and β.
2. φ is weakly decreasing in β.
3. If β =1 , then φ is weakly increasing in L. However, if β<1, then there exist values
of L for which φ>E (c).
4. If δ =1and β is suﬃciently low, then φ ≥ E(c) for all L 6=0 .
32Proof. For part 1, use c∗ = g(c∗).I fw eh o l dc∗ constant but increase either L or β,t h e n
g(c∗) increases. Since g(c∗) − c∗ is a decreasing function of c∗, the new value c∗∗ such that
g(c∗∗)=c∗∗ must be greater than c∗.





δ(L + E(c|c<c ∗)P(c<c ∗))
1+( 1− β)δc∗f(c∗) − δP(c>c ∗)
=
c∗(1 − δP(c>c ∗))/β
1 − δP(c>c ∗)+( 1− β)δc∗f(c∗)
≤ c
∗/β,
where the second equality comes from rearranging (5) and substituting into the numerator.
Now rearrange the indiﬀerence condition for c∗ to get φ = c∗/βδ − L, and diﬀerentiate











Note that equality holds if and only if f(c∗)=0 .I f f is zero on an interval within the
support of c,t h e nφ will not be strictly decreasing in β.
F o rp a r t3 ,n o t et h a t∂φ/∂L =( ∂c∗/∂L)/βδ − 1.I fβ =1 ,t h e nw ec a nd i ﬀerentiate (5)
implicitly with respect to L to get ∂c∗/∂L = δ/(1−δP(c>c ∗)) > 0.T h e r e f o r e ,∂φ/∂L > 0.
However, if β<1,t h e nc o n s i d e rL =¯ c/δ −E(c).F o rt h i sL,a tβ =1we have φ = E(c).
As β falls, by part 2, φ will increase (and at least initially will strictly increase, since f(c∗) > 0
near ¯ c).
Finally, for part 4, pick β<minc∗(c∗/E(c|c>c ∗)).S i n c eδ =1 , c∗ >cif L 6=0because
never acting leads to an inﬁnite present value of losses. If c∗ =¯ c then φ = E(c). Otherwise,
the indiﬀerence condition gives
c
∗ = β(L + φ) ≤ c
∗(L + φ)/E(c|c>c
∗),
or E(c|c>c ∗) ≤ L + φ; hence
φ = E(c|c<c
∗)P(c<c







(Incidentally, the suﬃcient condition β<minc∗(c∗/E(c|c>c ∗)) is interesting. It implies
that if the range ¯ c−c of possible transactions costs is small compared to the overall magnitude
33of the costs, then even very slightly present-biased agents will do worse on their own than
under a regime where they are forced to act immediately.)
We will use the following couple of facts later:
Corollary 16 If L>¯ c/δ − E(c),t h e nφ(L) ≥ E(c).
Proof. Exactly as for part 3 of Proposition 2.
Proposition 17 As β → 0 (and all other parameters stay constant), c∗ → c.A sL → 0,
c∗ → c also.
Proof. Both statements are obvious if δ<1,s i n c et h e nL<c (1 −δ)/βδ if β or L becomes








When c∗ is close to c, this equation can be uniquely solved for β with 0 <β<1,s oc∗ is the





As L → 0,w em u s th a v ee i t h e rc∗ − βE(c|c<c ∗) → 0 or P(c<c ∗) → 0.E i t h e ro ft h e s e
implies c∗ → c.
7.2 Optimality of Active Decisions
In this section we prove three propositions describing whether or not active decisions are
optimal in limiting cases.
Proposition 4 Hold δ,f, and l ﬁxed. If β is suﬃciently close to 1, then for any distribution
of optimal savings rates, active decisions are never optimal.
Proof. First, let ∆, ¯ ∆ bepoints inthe “ﬂat” parts of the graph of Φ(∆),s ot h a tΦ(∆)=E(c)
whenever ∆ < ∆ or ∆ > ¯ ∆.W h e nβ =1 ,w ek n o w
Z ¯ ∆
∆
(Φ(∆) − E(c)) d∆ < 0,
34since Φ(∆)=φ(l(∆)) is always ≤ E(c), with strict inequality when ∆ is near zero. Using
Corollary 15, this integral is continuous in β.S o f o r a l l s u ﬃciently large β, the integral
remains less than 0.F o c u sa t t e n t i o no nt h e s eβ,a n dﬁx ∆, ¯ ∆ suﬃciently far out to work for
all such β.
Take any such β, and consider an arbitrary distribution of optimal savings rates with





g(s)[Φ(s − d) − E(c)]ds
¶
dd. (6)
By using the fact that the integrand is 0 below ∆ and above ¯ ∆, and changing variables from














By choice of β, the value of the inner integral is negative.
Therefore, the value of the integral (6) is negative. So there must exist some value of d
for which the inner integral,
R ¯ s
s g(s)[Φ(s − d) − E(c)]ds, is negative, which means precisely
that this value of d is better than active decisions.
Proposition 5 Fix f,l, and δ.
1. Suppose δ =1 .I fβ is suﬃciently low, then active decisions are always optimal.
2. Suppose δ<1.I f¯ s − s is suﬃciently small, then the optimal default will always lie
between s and ¯ s (so the optimum is not active decisions).
Proof. The ﬁrst item is immediate from part 4 of Proposition 2: that proposition says
active decision is best for each individual employee, so it is also socially optimal.
The second part essentially follows from the fact that the dip to Φ(∆)=0at ∆ =0
is the lowest valley in the graph of Φ(∆). We state this more precisely as follows. For
L>0, we easily see that φ(L) > 0.C o n t i n u i t y o f φ means that it has a minimum on
the interval [c(1 − δ)/βδ,¯ c/βδ − E(c)], which necessarily is positive; call it φ.L e t L =
min{φ(1−δ)/δ,c(1−δ)/βδ}.T h eﬁrst quantity is the L that would generate losses φ if the
agent never opted out. The second quantity is the L above which the agent opts out with
some positive probability.
35L is in the region where the agent never opts out; φ is strictly increasing in L in this
region. Hence, for each L<L ,a n df o ra l lL0 >L ,w eh a v eφ(L0) >φ (L).( I fL0 starts at L
and increases, initially it lies in the region where c∗ = c and φ is increasing; then it is in the
region where the agent opts out with positive probability, but φ has a minimum of φ in this
region, which is greater than φ(L)).
Now, the assumptions on l imply we can choose ∆∗ such that l(∆) <Lwhenever |∆| <
∆∗. We claim that if ¯ s − s < ∆∗, then the optimal default lies inside [s, ¯ s].
Consider any default d<s .F o r e a c h s,w eh a v el(s − s) <Land l(s − d) >l (s − s).
Applying φ,w eg e tΦ(s − d) > Φ(s − s). So the default d is strictly worse than a default of
s for any given s in our range; hence it is socially worse than a default of s. Likewise, any
default d>¯ s is strictly worse than a default of ¯ s. This completes the proof.
Proposition 6 Fix f,l,a n dδ<1.I fs is uniformly distributed, then there exists a bound
w∗ with the following property: when β is suﬃciently low, active decisions are optimal when
¯ s − s >w ∗, and an internal default is optimal when ¯ s − s <w ∗.
Proof. Deﬁne Λ(∆)=l(∆)δ/(1−δ). The function Λ is the “limit” of Φ as β → 0.( I n d e e d ,
for any ﬁxed ∆, Φ(∆)=Λ(∆) when β is close enough to 0.) Consider all w with the following
property: there exists d such that
R w
0 Λ(s−d)ds ≤ wE(c). (That is, active decisions are not
optimal when ¯ s−s = w in the “β =0 ” case.) Let w∗ be the supremum of all such w. Clearly
w∗ is ﬁnite. For example, choose ˜ ∆ such that Λ(∆) > 2E(c) when |∆| > ˜ ∆;t h e nt h ea v e r a g e
of Λ on any interval of width greater than 4∆ is greater than E(c) (since Λ > 2E(c) on at
least half the interval), showing that w∗ < 4∆. On the other hand, the fact that Λ(∆) → 0
as ∆ → 0 implies that w∗ > 0.
For each w<w ∗,l e td(w) be a value that minimizes
R w
0 Λ(s − d)ds.C o n t i n u i t y a n d
compactness arguments show that we can deﬁne d∗ = d(w∗) so that
R w∗
0 Λ(s − d∗)ds ≤
w∗E(c). Thus the average value of Λ on [−d∗,w ∗ − d∗] is ≤ E(c). In fact, it must equal
E(c), or else we could widen the interval slightly, violating the deﬁnition of w∗. Similarly,
Λ ≥ E(c) at each endpoint of the interval, or else we could widen the interval and have the
average still be <E (c).I ti sc l e a rf r o mt h es h a p eo fΛ that for any w<w ∗,w ec a np u s h
the ends of our interval inward to get an interval of width w where the average value of Λ is
<E (c).
Now let β be any value low enough that
• l(∆) <c (1 − δ)/βδ when |∆| <w ∗;
36• ¯ c/δ − E(c) <c (1 − δ)/βδ.
Then Φ agrees with Λ on [−w∗,w ∗], and has value ≥ E(c) outside this interval. (This
latter follows from the fact that φ is increasing on [0,c(1 − δ)/βδ],a n dr e m a i n s≥ E(c) for
higher L by Corollary 16.)
So if w>w ∗, there is no interval of width w on which the average of Φ is less than E(c).
(If there were such an interval, trim away the part of the interval outside [−w∗,w ∗] and
expand the interval if necessary so that it includes 0.T h ea v e r a g eo fΦ in the expansion is
less than its average in the trimmed region. This gives us a subinterval of [−w∗,w ∗] having
width ≥ w∗ on which the average of Φ is less than E(c), which is impossible.)
And if w<w ∗, then we have seen that there is a subinterval of [−d∗,w ∗−d∗] ⊂ [−w∗,w ∗]
on which Λ has average less than E(c).S i n c eΦ agrees with Λ here, the result follows.
7.3 Characterizing Optimal Default Policies
As stated in the main text, we now study the special case in which c and s are both uniformly
distributed, l(∆)=κ∆2,a n dδ =1 .W eﬁrst need a careful characterization of the shape of
the function Φ(∆).
Lemma 7 With the assumptions of the previous paragraph,
• If 2 − ¯ c/c <β<1,t h e r ee x i s t0 < ∆m < ¯ ∆ such that Φ(∆) is increasing on [0,∆m],
decreasing on [∆m, ¯ ∆], and constant at E(c)=( c +¯ c)/2 on [¯ ∆,∞].
• If β ≤ 2−¯ c/c, then there exists ¯ ∆ such that Φ(∆) is decreasing on (0, ¯ ∆] and constant
at E(c) on [¯ ∆,∞].
Proof. It suﬃces to show the analogous statement for φ(L):i f2 − ¯ c/c <β<1,t h e r ee x i s t
0 <L m < ¯ L such that φ(L) is increasing on [0,L m],d e c r e a s i n go n[Lm, ¯ L], and constant at
E(c) on [¯ L,∞];i fβ<2− ¯ c/c then there exists ¯ L such that φ(L) is decreasing on (0, ¯ L] and
constant at E(c) on [¯ L,∞].T h e n ∆m =
p
Lm/κ and ¯ ∆ =
p
¯ L/κ. Clearly we should set
¯ L =¯ c/β − E(c),s i n c eφ is constant above this ¯ L.
We wish to compute dφ/dL for L<¯ L.T od ot h i s ,ﬁrst rewrite equation (2) using the






37Incidentally, (7) holds when δ<1 as well. We can treat this as an expression for φ in terms






c∗(1 − 2/β)+¯ c/β
¯ c − c
.
This is decreasing in c∗,z e r oa tc∗ =¯ c/(2 − β) < ¯ c (hence negative at c∗ =¯ c), and positive










and c∗ is increasing in L (for L<¯ L) by Proposition 2. So dφ/dL has the same sign as
dφ/dc∗, which was computed in the previous paragraph. It follows that if β>2 − ¯ c/c then
φ is increasing in L up until the (unique) value for which c∗ =¯ c/(2 − β) (this value exists
by Corollary 15 and Proposition 17), and decreasing for higher values of L;i fβ ≤ 2 − ¯ c/c
then φ is always decreasing in L.
From this proof we can directly calculate the values of ¯ ∆ and ∆m.F i r s t ,f r o m¯ L,w eh a v e
¯ ∆ =
r
¯ c/β − (¯ c + c)/2
κ
.






Plugging in ¯ c/(2−β) for c∗,a n du s i n gE(c|c<c ∗)=( c+c∗)/2 and P(c<c ∗)=( c∗−c)/(¯ c−c)
for the uniform distribution, we get
Lm =
(¯ c − βc)(¯ c − (2 − β)c)
2β(2 − β)(¯ c − c)
⇒ ∆m =
s
(¯ c − βc)(¯ c − (2 − β)c)
2β(2 − β)(¯ c − c)κ
.
We can also calculate the value of ∆e,t h ev a l u eb e l o w¯ ∆ for which Φ(∆e)=E(c),i fi t
exists. We do this by ﬁnding Le such that φ(Le)=E(c).N o t et h a ta tt h i sLe, (7) implies
38c∗/β = E(c|c>c ∗).U s i n gE(c|c>c ∗)=( ¯ c + c∗)/2 gives c∗ = β¯ c/(2 − β).T h e n( 8 )g i v e s
Le =




β¯ c − (2 − β)c
2(2 − β)κ
.
Now, as mentioned in the main text, we need to prove that when β>2 − ¯ c/c,s ot h a t
the function Φ has humps, the outer portion of the humps is steeper than the inner portion.
Lemma 18 For 0 < ∆ < ¯ ∆, d3Φ/d∆3 < 0.
Proof. Write out the condition (5) for c∗ explicitly, using the uniform distribution. This
condition is a quadratic equation for c∗, whose constant term is a linear function of L and
whose other coeﬃcients are independent of L.S oc∗ c a nb ew r i t t e ni nt h ef o r m
√
A + BL+C,
where A, B,a n dC are constants.35 Next, φ = c∗/β − L (the indiﬀerence condition for c∗
rearranged) can be written in the form
¡√
A + BL+ C
¢
/β − L,w h e r eA + BL ≥ 0 on the
relevant range.
Finally, using L = κ∆2, we see we can write Φ(∆) in the form
¡√
A + Bκ∆2 + C
¢
/β −
κ∆2. By taking ∆ → 0, we see A ≥ 0. It is straightforward to check that the third derivative
of this function is
−3AB2κ2∆
β(A + Bκ∆2)5/2 < 0.
(We can check that A is strictly greater than zero because diﬀerentiating (5) shows that
dc∗/dL 6→∞as L → 0,w h e r e a sA =0implies dc∗/dL →∞as L → 0.)
Proposition 19 If 0 < ∆1 < ∆2 < ¯ ∆ and Φ(∆1)=Φ(∆2),t h e nΦ0(∆1)+Φ0(∆2) < 0.(Note
that ∆1 is on the inside of the hump and ∆2 is on the outside.)
Proof. Let Ψ(∆)=dΦ/d∆.B yL e m m a1 8 ,Ψ is concave. Jensen’s inequality implies that
t h ea v e r a g ev a l u eo fΨ on the interval [∆1,∆2] is greater than the average of its value at the
two endpoints. But
R ∆2
∆1 Ψ(∆)d∆ = Φ(∆2) − Φ(∆1)=0 , so the average value of Ψ on the
interval is zero. Hence, the average of the values of Ψ at ∆1 and ∆2 must be negative.
Now we are ﬁnally prepared to prove the classiﬁcation of possible optimal defaults.
Proposition 8 If β<1, then the optimal default is one of the following three types:
35The explicit expression is c∗ =( c +
p
(1 − β)2c2 +2 β(2 − β)(¯ c − c)L)/(2 − β). One can check that the
lower root of the quadratic is less than c.
39• the center default d =( s +¯ s)/2;
• an oﬀset default, such that s−d = −∆e while ¯ s−d>¯ ∆ (or its symmetric equivalent,
¯ s − d = ∆e and s − d<−¯ ∆);
• active decisions, which correspond to any d with s − d ≥ ¯ ∆ or ¯ s − d ≤−¯ ∆.
Proof. For the purposes of this proof, we redeﬁne Φ(0) to equal lim∆→0 Φ(∆).T h i sm a k e s
Φ continuous everywhere and (by Corollary 15) diﬀerentiable except at ∆ =0 ,±¯ ∆.
The optimal default is the d that minimizes the average value of Φ on [s − d, ¯ s − d], i.e.
that minimizes
R ¯ s
s Φ(s − d)ds. As observed in the main text, a minimum always exists. By
diﬀerentiating with respect to d,w eg e tt h eﬁrst-order condition
Φ(s − d) − Φ(¯ s − d)=0
that any optimum must satisfy. The second-order condition is
−Φ
0(s − d)+Φ
0(¯ s − d) ≥ 0,
which must hold if both derivatives are deﬁned.
Consider now the common value Φ(¯ s − d)=Φ(s − d) that emerges from the ﬁrst-order
condition. We use Lemma 7 to draw conclusions about where ¯ s − d and s − d are located
for a given common value:
• If the common value is <E (c), then there are only two points ±∆ where Φ takes on
this value. So ¯ s − d = −(s − d), and we have a center default.
• If the common value is >E (c),t h e nw em a y( i fβ<2 − ¯ c/c)a g a i nh a v ej u s tt w o
points where Φ takes on this value. At most, there are four such points, of the form
±∆1,±∆2,w h e r e0 < ∆1 < ∆m < ∆2 < ¯ ∆.I fs − d, ¯ s − d are equal to ±∆1 then we
have a center default. Otherwise, assume ¯ s − d = ∆2. (By symetry, the argument is
equivalent when s − d = −∆2.)
If s − d = −∆2 we have a center default. If s − d = −∆1,t h e n
−Φ
0(s − d)+Φ
0(¯ s − d)=Φ
0(∆1)+Φ
0(∆2) < 0
40by Proposition 19. This violates the second-order condition. And if s − d = ∆1 then
t h ee n t i r ei n t e r v a l[s − d, ¯ s − d] lies within the hump, so that Φ(s) >E (c) for each s,
and this default is strictly worse than active decision.
• If the common value is equal to E(c), then the possible values for the two endpoints
are ±∆e and ±∆ for any ∆ ≥ ¯ ∆. If the endpoints are ±∆e then we have a center
default. Otherwise, without loss of generality, assume ¯ s − d ≥ ¯ ∆.
If s−d ≤−¯ ∆ then the interval [s−d, ¯ s−d] contains both humps and the valley between
them. We can increase d until the upper endpoint ¯ s − d hits ∆e, thus eliminating one
hump and replacing it with a plateau. This changes the integral of Φ by
R ¯ ∆
∆e(E(c) −
Φ(∆))d∆ < 0. Thus, total social loss is decreased, so the original d was not optimal.
If s − d = −∆e then we have an oﬀset default. And if s − d = ∆e then the interval
contains one hump and a plateau, which is again strictly inferior to active decisions.
N o ww eh a v es h o w nt h a tt h eo p t i m a ld e f a u l tt y p e ss h o w ni nF i g u r e8a r ei n d e e dt h eo n l y
types that can occur, and we are ready to describe the regions where each of them occurs.
Proposition 9 Fix κ, c,a n d¯ c. Then there exist values 0 <β ac <β oc < 1,a n daf u n c t i o n
w :( βac,1] → (0,∞], with the following properties:
1. for β ≤ βac, active decisions are always optimal;
2. for βac <β<β oc, active decisions are optimal when ¯ s−s >w (β) and a center default
is optimal when ¯ s − s <w (β);
3. for βoc <β<1,a no ﬀset default is optimal when ¯ s − s >w (β) and a center default
is optimal when ¯ s − s <w (β);
4. w is increasing on (βac,βoc].
Proof. First, ﬁxa n yβ<1.D e ﬁne w(β) to be the supremum of values ¯ s − s for which a
center default is optimal, or 0 if a center default is never optimal. This supremum is ﬁnite;
for example, if ¯ s − s > 2¯ ∆, then a center default implies that the interval [s − d, ¯ s − d]
contains both humps of the function Φ, and this is strictly worse than the oﬀset default,
which contains only one of the humps.
41Now suppose a center default is optimal for some width ¯ s−s. We claim it is also optimal
for all narrower widths. First we check that a center default remains better than active
decisions. We are given Z r
−r
Φ(∆)d∆ ≤ 2rE(c) (9)
for r =( ¯ s−s)/2, and we want to show it remains true for all lower r. The derivative of the
left side with respect to r is 2Φ(r),w h i c hi s≥ 2E(c) if r ≥ ∆e.T h u s , a s w e l o w e r r but
keep r ≥ ∆e, the left side of (9) decreases faster than the right side, so (9) stays true. And
if r<∆e, then (9) holds because Φ(∆) <E (c) for −r<∆ <r .
Next we check that a center default remains better than an oﬀset default (if the oﬀset







for r =( ¯ s−s)/2, then it also holds for all lower r ≥ (∆e+ ¯ ∆)/2. This is completely analogous
to (9): for all r i nt h er e l e v a n tr a n g e ,t h ed e r i v a t i v eo ft h el e f ts i d eo f( 1 0 )i s2Φ(r) ≥ 2E(c),
while the derivative of the right side is 2Φ(2r −∆e)=2 E(c).S oa sr decreases, the left side
decreases faster than the right side, and (10) remains true.
This shows that if a center default is optimal, it remains optimal when the range of s is
narrowed. Therefore, a center default is optimal whenever ¯ s − s <w (β).B y d e ﬁnition, a
center default is not optimal for ¯ s − s >w (β), so the optimal default here is either oﬀset or
active decisions.
A similar argument to the above shows that if active decisions are better than an oﬀset
default, then this remains the case when the range ¯ s − s is increased, and similarly if oﬀset
defaults are preferred to active decisions. (As explained in the main text, the marginal
employee is in the plateau of the function Φ(∆) in both cases.) So for ﬁxed β, either active
decision is best for all ¯ s − s >w (β),o ro ﬀset defaults are best for all ¯ s − s >w (β).C a l lβ
an “active value” or an “oﬀset value” accordingly. Proposition 3 implies that if some β is an
active value, then all lower β are also active values.
By Proposition 5, for all suﬃciently low β, active decisions are optimal for all possible
distributions of s.D e ﬁne βac to be the supremum of all β for which this is true when
s is uniformly distributed. Part 1 of Proposition 9 immediately holds. Conversely, by
42Proposition 4, when β is high enough, active decisions are never optimal. Deﬁne βoc to be
the supremum of all β such that active decisions are optimal for some width ¯ s−s.T h u sw e
have 0 <β ac ≤ βoc < 1;m o r e o v e r ,a l lβ<β oc are active values, and all β>β oc are oﬀset
values. We will check that βac <β oc strictly. When β = βoc and ¯ s − s >w (β), the planner
must be indiﬀerent between oﬀset defaults and active decisions; that is,
Z ¯ ∆
−∆e
Φ(∆)d∆ =(¯ ∆ + ∆e)E(c). (11)
Indeed, if the left side is less than the right side (so that oﬀset defaults are preferred), then
by continuity this remains true when β is lowered slightly, and active decisions are never
optimal for any ¯ s−s at this lower β. This violates the deﬁnition of βoc.As i m i l a ra r g u m e n t
applies if the left side is greater than the right side. But (11) implies that Φ(∆) <E (c) for
some ∆, since the integral includes a hump where Φ(∆) >E (c). T h i si m p l i e st h a ta c t i v e
decisions are not optimal when ¯ s − s is suﬃciently small, and this remains true when β is
decreased slightly. Hence, β can be decreased slightly from βoc and still be ≥ βac,p r o v i n g
βac <β oc.
Now, parts 2 and 3 of Proposition 9 were eﬀectively proven two paragraphs ago. Finally,
Proposition 3 implies that inf{¯ s−s : active decisions are optimal} can never decrease when
β increases. This proves part 4.
The last bit of our analysis is the case β =1 . This result is more general; it does not
depend on the distribution of transactions costs. The point is simply that the function Φ(∆)
consists of a valley with no humps; the optimal default always takes as much advantage as
p o s s i b l eo ft h i sv a l l e y .
Proposition 10 Fix κ,c, and ¯ c, and assume β =1 .L e t¯ ∆ be the smallest value with
Φ(¯ ∆)=E(c).T h e n
• if ¯ s − s ≤ 2¯ ∆, then a center default d =( ¯ s + s)/2 is the unique optimum;
• otherwise, the set of optimal defaults consists of all d ∈ [s + ¯ ∆, ¯ s − ¯ ∆].
(The value of ¯ ∆ is the same as before, and it simpliﬁes to
p
(¯ c − c)/2κ when β =1 .)
Proof. First, we carry out the same analysis as in Proposition 8. When β =1 ,P r o p o s i t i o n
2t e l l su st h a tΦ is increasing in |∆| for |∆| ≤ ¯ ∆,a n dt h e nb e c o m e sﬂat at E(c) for |∆| ≥ ¯ ∆.




The ﬁrst-order condition is
Φ(s − d)=Φ(¯ s − d).
If this common value is <E (c), then by monotonicity, there are only two values ±∆ at
which Φ t a k e so nt h i sv a l u e .H e n c e ,s − d = −(¯ s − d), and we have a center default.
Otherwise, the common value is E(c),w h i c hi sΦ(∆) for all ∆ ≤− ¯ ∆ or ∆ ≥ ¯ ∆.B y
symmetry we may assume ¯ s − d ≥ ¯ ∆.I fs − d ≥ ¯ ∆ then we have an active-decision regime,
which cannot be optimal (by Proposition 4). Hence s − d ≤−¯ ∆. Then the social welfare
integral is equal to Z ¯ ∆
−¯ ∆
Φ(∆)d∆ +(¯ s − s − 2¯ ∆)E(c),
and this value is independent of the choice of default d as long as s−d ≤−¯ ∆ and ¯ s−d ≥ ¯ ∆;
that is, d ∈ [s + ¯ ∆, ¯ s − ¯ ∆].S oi fo n es u c hd is optimal, all of them are.
All possible optima are of one of these two types. The ﬁrst type of optimum only exists
for ¯ s − s < 2¯ ∆,w h i l et h es e c o n dt y p eo n l ye x i s t sf o r¯ s − s ≥ 2¯ ∆. The proposition follows
immediately.
7.4 The Case of Naive Workers
In the employee’s problem, analysis of naive agents is a mild extension of analysis of so-
phisticated agents. The naive agent expects all future selves to have short-term discount
factor b β>βinstead of β, with all other parameters unchanged (and believes that this is
common knowledge among all future selves). Therefore, she expects that all future selves
will use the cutoﬀ c∗ and incur the total loss φ that she would have if she were a sophisticated
(b β,δ)-discounter. We refer to these values as b c∗,b φ, respectively, and continue to use c∗,φto
refer to the values that actually hold for the naive agent.
Proposition 11 In the employee model, if f,β,δ, and L are held ﬁxed, then c∗ is (weakly)
decreasing in b β,a n dφ is (weakly) increasing in b β.
Proof. From Proposition 2, φ is decreasing in β for sophisticated agents. This implies that,
44for ﬁxed β, b φ is decreasing in b β.N o w b φ is the total loss that the period-t self expects to
experience beginning in period t+1if she doesn’t act in period t. So her total loss from not
acting immediately (she believes) is βδ(L+b φ). The usual indiﬀerence condition applies, and
c∗ = βδ(L + b φ) (truncated as usual to [c,¯ c]). Hence, c∗ is decreasing in b β.
Now, holding β ﬁxed, let c∗
β be the cutoﬀ used by a sophisticated (β,δ)-discounter. If the
a g e n ti sn a i v e ,s h ew i l lu s es o m ec∗ ≤ c∗
β. Her total loss φ i sg i v e ni nt e r m so fc∗ by equation
(2), which does not involve β or b β. So we just need to check that φ, given as a function of
c∗ by (2), is decreasing on [c,c ∗
β].
Corollary 15 and Proposition 17 tell us that c∗ covers [c,c ∗
β] as β falls to 0 (for sophisti-
cates), and Proposition 2 tells us that as β decreases, c∗ decreases and φ increases. Since φ
is given by (2) in the naive case too, φ is decreasing in c∗,a sn e e d e d .
Proposition 13 Fix f,β,b β.A s s u m eδ =1 . For all suﬃciently small L,t h ea g e n tw i l ls e t
c∗ = c.
Proof. Proposition 17 tells us that for a sophisticated agent, c∗ → c as L → 0.S of o rt h e
naive agent, b c∗ → c as L → 0. For low enough L,w eh a v eβδ(L+b φ)=b c∗(β/b β) <c ,a n dt h e
naive agent will set c∗ = c.
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48Table 1. 401(k) plan features by effective date 
  Effective January 1, 1997  Effective November 23, 1997 
Eligibility    
Eligible employees  U.S. employees, age 18+  U.S. employees, age 18+ 
First eligible  Full-time employees eligible 
upon hire; part-time employees 
must accrue 1,000 hours in 1 
year 
Full-time employees eligible 
upon hire; part-time employees 
must accrue 1,000 hours in 1 
year  
Employer match eligible  Immediately upon plan 
eligibility 
Immediately upon plan 
eligibility 
Enrollment  First 30 days of employment or 
January 1 of succeeding 
calendar years 
Daily 
Contributions    
Employee contributions
 a  Up to 17% of compensation  Up to 17% of compensation 
Non-discretionary employer 
match rate 
50% of employee contribution  50% of employee contribution 
Discretionary employer 
match rate 
Up to 100% (50% for bonus-
eligible employees); rate 
depended on company 
profitability 
Up to 100% (50% for bonus-
eligible employees); rate 





Match on the lesser of before-
tax employee contribution or 
5% of compensation; match 
invested in employer stock 
Match on the lesser of before-
tax employee contribution or 
5% of compensation; match 
invested in employer stock 
Employer match vesting  Immediate Immediate 
Other    
Loans  Not available  Available; 2 maximum 
Hardship withdrawals  Available  Available 
Investment choices  4 options; employer stock also 
available, but only for after-tax 
contributions and employer 
match 
6 options + employer stock 
(available for before- and after-
tax contributions) 
aTotal employee contributions within each year were capped by federal law at $9,500 (1997), 
$10,000 (1998-99), and $10,500 (2000-01).
 
bActual discretionary match rates were 20% (1995), 20% (1996), 100% (1997), 100% (1998), 27% 
(1999), 33% (2000), 0% (2001).  
Table II. Comparison of worker characteristics 
 Study  company 













Average age (years)  34.7 34.1  40.8  38.8 
Gender        
 Male  47.6%  42.0%  44.7%  53.1% 
 Female  52.4%  58.0%  55.3%  46.9% 
Marital Status        
 Single  41.4%  49.3%  32.2%  39.0% 
 Married  56.0%  49.7%  66.8%  61.0% 
Compensation        
 Avg. monthly base pay  $3,043  $2,869  $4,367  -- 
 Median monthly base pay  $2,666  $2,513  $3,664  -- 
 Avg. annual income
a $35,381  $33,197  $50,414  $32,414 
 Median annual income
a $31,013  $29,239  $40,965  $24,108 
Geography        
 East  13.2%  11.1%  15.0%  18.9% 
 Midwest  34.3%  37.6%  32.2%  24.1% 
 South  37.7%  38.9%  37.7%  34.7% 
 West  14.7%  12.3%  15.0%  22.4% 
Number of Employees  2,231 2,349  46,944  -- 
The samples in the first three columns are taken from individuals employed at the study company 
as of the dates indicated in the column title. The sample in the last column is all individuals 
(weighted) in the March 1998 Current Population Survey who worked in the previous year. 
Compensation is in 1998 dollars.  Figures may not add up to 100% because of missing data and 
employees located in Puerto Rico. 
aThe annual income measure that is reported to us for the study company is the employee’s 
annual taxable (W2) income. Annual income for the U.S. workforce calculated from the CPS is 
total annual labor earnings in the previous calendar year, some of which may be non-taxable.  
  
Table 3. Tobit regression of contribution rates under two 401(k) enrollment regimes 
Intercept 2.915** 
  (0.191) 
Female  0.545 
  (0.403) 
Married  1.335** 
  (0.383) 
Log(Base pay) 4.898** 
  (0.666) 
0 ≤ Age < 30  -6.829* 
  (2.681) 
30 ≤ Age < 40  -5.144 
  (2.683) 
40 ≤ Age < 50  -5.133 
  (2.703) 
50 ≤ Age < 60  -3.182 
  (2.753) 
Active-decision cohort  0.086 
  (0.247) 
Active decision cohort × Female  -1.989** 
  (0.547) 
Active-decision cohort × Married -0.528 
  (0.503) 
Active-decision cohort × Log(Base pay) -1.930 
  (1.053) 
Active-decision cohort × (0 ≤ Age < 30)  -0.584 
  (3.553) 
Active-decision cohort × (30 ≤ Age < 40)  -0.577 
  (3.552) 
Active-decision cohort × (40 ≤ Age < 50)  0.004 
  (3.578) 
Active-decision cohort × (50 ≤ Age < 60)  -0.103 
  (3.659) 
ln (σAD/σSE)
  -0.137** 
  (0.042) 
N  3,488 
If the employee is in the active-decision cohort, the dependent variable is the 401(k) contribution rate (in 
percentage points) 3 months after hire; if the employee is in the standard-enrollment cohort, the dependent 
variable is the contribution rate 30 months after hire. Independent variables are log of base pay, a dummy 
for being in the active-decision cohort, and gender, marital status, and age range dummies, calculated as of 
the contribution-rate date. Demographic variables are de-meaned. Both cohorts are restricted to employees 
who remain in the data for at least 30 months. The tobit regression assumes that errors are normal and 
homoskedastic within each cohort but possibly heteroskedastic across cohorts.  Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses under the point estimates. 



















































































Active-decision cohort Standard-enrollment cohort
Figure 1. Fraction of employees enrolled in the 401(k), by hire month. The fraction displayed is 
as of the third month of tenure at the company. The active-decision cohort was hired between 
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Active-decision cohort Standard-enrollment cohort
Figure 2. Fraction of employees enrolled in the 401(k) plan, by tenure at company. An employee 
is counted enrolled in the 401(k) even if he or she has stopped contributing to the plan. The series 
are not monotonically rising because they are constructed from multiple cross-sections, so the 
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Active-decision cohort    Standard-enrollment cohort   
 
Figure 3. Average 401(k) contribution rate by tenure at company. At each point, the averages 
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Figure 4. Average 401(k) contribution rate among 401(k) participants by tenure at company. At 
each point, the averages exclude employees not currently contributing a positive amount to the 
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Figure 5. 401(k) contribution rates at different contribution-rate percentiles. The percentile breakpoints are calculated separately for each cohort at each point 
in time. 
Active-decision cohort Standard-enrollment cohort  
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Figure 6. 401(k) balance-to-base pay ratios at different balance-to-base pay percentiles. The balances exclude outstanding loan principal and any money rolled 
into the account from a former employer. The percentile breakpoints are calculated separately for each cohort at each point in time. 






















Figure 7. Employee’s total expected loss φ as a function of per-period flow loss L from not opting out. The parameters specific to each panel, the quasi-
hyperbolic discount factor β and the exponential discount factor δ, are shown beneath each graph. In all panels, opt-out costs are assumed to be uniformly 
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Figure 8. Mean time between hire date and enrollment by contribution rate in the standard-enrollment 
cohort. The area of each bubble is proportional to the number of employees it represents. The sample consists 
of all employees in the standard-enrollment cohort who worked at the company for at least 30 months and 


















Figure 9. Possible optimal default regimes when opt-out costs and optimal savings rates are uniformly distributed and δ = 1. The panels illustrate 
parameter values that support the three classes of optimal defaults: the center default, the offset default, and active decisions. The shaded area in 
each panel represents the social welfare losses generated by the corresponding default regime. The parameters specific to each panel, the quasi-
hyperbolic discount factor β and the range of optimal savings rates ss − , appear below each figure. In all three panels, the opt-out cost is 
uniformly distributed between 0.25 and 1.75, and the loss function scaling factor  100 κ = . The left and center panels have the same y-axis scale, 
but the right panel has a different y-axis scale. 
Center default Offset default Active decisions



























Figure 10. Characterization of optimal default regimes when opt-out costs and optimal savings rates are uniformly distributed and δ = 1. This 
figure shows the boundaries of the optimal default regimes as a function of the quasi-hyperbolic discount factor β and the range of optimal savings 
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